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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DON BARTON,
Plantiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 10722

JOHN JENSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Brief of Respondent

L. E. MIDGLEY,
415 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Appellant

DON V. TIBBS
50 North Main
Manti, Utah 84642
Attorney for Respondent

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as they appeared in the
lower court.

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff for personal injuries and
property damages arising out of a motor vehicle collision
involving vehicles driven by the parties.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury. The court submitted '"
special verdict consisting of six "propositicms". After deliberation the jury returned answers to the propositions in fav 01
of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

The Trial Court

after polling the jurors entered a Judgment on the verdict
in conformity with the jurors anwsers to proposition number

6 for a total sum of $4,389.00 (See Polling of Jury as regarr],,
to Proposition Number 3 - page 7).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant appellant seeks reversal of

the Judgment

on the verdict rendered by the lower cou1t Plaintiff-respondent contends that the trial court's ruling sb0u1d be sust<lined.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 23, 18'65 the Plaintiff-rcspoudent

WJ'

driving his custom built International Grain Truck loa<leL:
with 8,000 pounds of grain in a Southerly direction on Utah
Highway 11, south of Chester, Sanpete Cuunty. ULah appi u·,
imately 35 miles per hour. The defendant-appellant's pickup
truck was travelling in the sam0 di1·ecticn at

<1

slower speed

ahead of the plaintiff. lt was 3: 30 p. m. in the afternoon. the
day was clear and the road dry. Tht" plaintiff signalled b.>
lights his intention to pass and started to pass in the cleat·
opposite lane of traffic. The defendant without warning

ur

signalling turned his motor vehicle di2gonally left acrosss the
said highway to enter a private field.

P 1a i n t i f f

to avoid collision, but it was tn 1 late c.nd the

t'.'lu

tried

vehiclb

collided; the plaintiff's vehicle rolled (,ver, was damar:;ed, :rnd
the plaintiff was injured. The grain was s::attered all ()\ 1
the road

'J

"

There were no homes in the area. (T. 6) Field pastures
were on both sides of the road. There were no intersections,
but there were some private gateways to the fields. (T. 7)
The speed limit at the place of collision was 60 miles per hour.
(T. 8) Defendant gave no signal to turn, either by light or
arm. Plaintiff immediately hit his brakes and turned to the
right to try to avoid the collision. There was a squealing
noise, a crash and the plaintiff truck went out of control. (T. 9)
Immediately after the collision, :?laintiff asked defendant, "Don't you ever signal when you turn?" Defendant said,
"I thought you was further back:" (T. 11) Defendant Jensen
also stated, "Don't worry about your truck, it will be taken
care of." (T. 18) Mr. Jensen also told a witness, Mr. LaVar
Hill who came by after the accident (T. 96)
"I said, (LaVar Hili testifying)
"What happened?"
He said, (Mr. Jensen, the defendant)
"Well I was watching the truck coming behind
me, and my guess in distance, I thought he was further back than he was, and when I went to turn,
he bumped me."
The case was tried to a Jury who were submitted a
Special Verdict o[ Six propositions (R. 46) . In proposition
No. 6 the Jury itemized the damages p:aintiff suffered as ::1
prominate result of the collision.
It is concerning one of the Com·t's instructions and
the special verdict and propositions, and the court's polling
the Jury that the Defend~mt relies upcn in this appeal. Tlw
trial itself and the evidence submitted is clearly in conformity
with plaintiff's pleadi:igs,

and the eddence

warrants

the

finding of a verdict for plaintiff in the amounts stated of
Medical expenses & X-Ray
$ 54.00
For cost of Drugs
66.00
Truck Damage
715.00
Damage to custom built attachment
763.00
For loss of Turkey Feed (gram)
221.00
General Damages - Including
loss of earnings
Loss of use of truck
Total

2000.00
570.00
$4389.00

The verdict as above found was signed by six ot
eight jurors.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE VERDICT AS RETURNED BY THE JURY,
AS POLLED BY THE COURT, AND AS SIGNED BY 6 JURORS IS IN FAVOR OF THE
PLAINTIFF.
When the jury returned at 6: 00 P. M. (p.122) the
answers to the Verdict were not complete and it was obvious
to the court and counsel the verdict was ambiguous. The
court sent the Jury back to clear up the inconsistency. (p 123)
The Court pointed out that the answers were im:onsistent. The
Plaintiff could not be contributary negligent in not seeing a
signal Defendant had been negligent in not giving. (T. 122)
The foreman indicated they \vould consider it again
and the Jury returned to the Jury room.
At 7: 30 the Jury returned with their verdict. It

w:i,

:i

obvious the Jury knew their

decision

but

did not

un-

derstand the Court in the propositicn No. 3 about Proximate
Cause. The Court then polled the jury and after asking each
juror for his answer, a verdict was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff for the amount of damages set forth by the jury
in its verdict.
The amount of damages had alreo.dy been in the verdict before the polling and the verdict had already been
signed. It was obvious by reading all the questions and answers together that the jury intended the plaintiff to recover
m the amount they found.
It is the defendant's contention in this case that the

Court should have accepted the inconsistent verdict, which
the court refused to do.
The principle is general (53 Am. Jur. Section 1099) that
when a jury returns ::m insensible or inconsistent verdict, or
one that is not responsive to the issues submitted, or is in
disregard of the instructions of the c-iurt, they may be directed
by the court to rec:.;nsider it and bring back a proper verdict.
This may be done with or without consent of counsel.
should be done whether asked or not.

It

As to special verdicts or to special findings the practice
is really only an application of the settled rule that until
the verdict has been filed (ff the jury has been discharged as
unable to agree, their connection with the
to an end. Even though polled, they may
having announced their verdict, if the
satisfied they have given the case proper

case has not come
be sent back, after
trial judge is not
consideration.

When the jurors are sent back to reconsider their verdict, they may amend it not only by correcting a mistake in

form, or by making plain that which was obscure. They may
alter i.t in substance, if they so agree. The case is still in their
hands on their second retirement, and they are not bound by
their former action, they are at liberty to review the case
and bring in an entirely new verdict. (Grant vs. State - Florida -14 S 757 - 23 LRA 723.)
While it is clear that the trial judge may send the jury
back to the consultation room for the purpose of correcting
their findings as to matters of informality and uncertainty.
and where the issue has not been passed upon by them, yeL
the Judge must not throw the weight of his influence into
the deliberation of the jury as to matters exclusively within
their province.
In this case, there was nothing said or done by the
Judge in any of his actions, statements or questions which
would in any way have indicated that the Jury should find
one way or the other. His statements were strictly for the
purpose of obtaining from the jury their verdict.
In 53

Am. Jur. Section

108~,

it

states

the

court

may decline to receive a special verdict, the findings of which
are inconsistent and manifestly m:c1<lc unde1· a

m10~2pprehension

of the instructions, and after explaining the instructions previously given, may direct the jury to retire for further consultation.
Section

1063

of

53

Am.

Jur.

states

that-

"A Special Verdict as distinguished from the General Verdict
is one in which the jury finds all of the facts of the case, and
refers the decisions of the cause upon those facts to the court.
The purpose of a Special Verdict is to furnish the basis
the Judgment to be rendered.''

<''

Section 1015 of 53 Am. Jur. states that
ln polling a Jury each juror must be questioned individually,
and it is a reversible error for the court, when a poll is demanded to propound questions

to the jurors collectively,

instead of individually.
In the present case the court on request of counsel (the
reque.ot does not appear on the record but it was made in
open court) polled the jury on the findings for the direct
purpose of making sure that the jurors understood the answers to the propositions.

Six of the eight jurors answered

that the Defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of
the collision (T.129) "THE; COURT: They are holding he did
not give an adequate signal.
PROPOSITION No. 3
Was this failure to give an adequate signal a
proximate cause of the collision
Q
A

Mr. Nell?
Yes.

Q Mr. Childs?
A Yes.
Q Mr. Moss?
A Yes.
Q Mrs. Black?
A Yes.
Q Was his failure to give an adequate signal a proximate cause of the collision?
A Yes.
THE COURT: Your answer is what?
MRS. BLACK: Yes.
THE COURT: Q Mr. Kenner?

8

A

Yes.

Q

Mr. Anderson, was his failure to give an adequate
signal as you have found, a proximate cause of the
collision?

A

Yes."

After the polling was completed the court entered judgment on the verdict.
In all the polling there was only one juror that indicated
confusion, and as soon as he understood what the court was
asking answered the question in conformity with the prior
written verdict.
Rule 47 (r) URCP - provides that if a verdict as
rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be corrected by
the Jury under the advice of the Court, or the jury may be
sent out again.
In this case the court on its own motion determined
the first answers were inconsistent and instructed the Jury
in conformity with Rule 47 (r) and 49 (b) to return to the
Jury Room and make a consistent verdict. This the jury did
and the latter polling showed conclusively the verdict oI the
Jury.
The defendant contends that the court misled the Jury
- even going so far as to say that the statement of the Judge,
"Don't overlook the instructions that the verdict is to be
signed at the end" was misleading.
The court's written instructions stated the verdict was
to be signed. For counsel to now say that the oral statement
caused their confusion would even argue with Rule 49 (bj
which requires every verdict to be in writing signed by the

9

foreman.

Obviously this statement by the Judge was not

improper.
Our Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 47 (r) recognize that
there may be times when a verdict is not sufficient and it may
be corrected under advice of the courts, or the jury may be
sent out again.
All communication between the trial judge and jury
look place in open court in the presence of the parties and
their counsel. It is clear by record there was no deliberation
by the Jury in open court and it is clear by the answers to
Proposition No. 3, set forth on record that the .Tury held that

the Defendants negligence was the proximate cause of the
collision.
POINT TWO
THE POLLING OF JURY WAS NOT
REVERSIBLE ERROR
Rule 47 (g) URCP provides the verdict must be in
writing, signed by the foreman, and that either side may require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court
or clerk asking each juror if it is his verdict. If upon such
inquiry or polling there is a sufficient number of jurors agreeing the verdict is complete.
In this case the verdict as rendered set forth specifically the damages found to have been suffered by Plaintiff.
Because of the answer to Proposition 3 the court polled the
,Tury for their answers.
There was no deliberating by the Jury on the polling
when the Judge asked the questions.
Defendant in hi.s brief relies upon two cases, neither

10
of which is applicable here.
In Carma-vs-Albertsen: 16 Ut2 145, 377 Pac.2 67, a slip
and fall case, the verdict was not finished when the Jury was
brought to the courtroom, they then filled it in, discussed it
and then signed it.
In our case the verdict was completed, signed and the
polling took place because of the obvious mistake of the
answer to Proposition number 3. On the polling, the Jury's
answers showed they found the proximate cause of the collisi011
was the defendants negligence.
Defendant further relies upon Johnson-v.o-Maynard: ~
UT2 268, 342 Pac. 2nd 884, where the Judge went into the Jury
room to advise the Jury on a point of law in the absence
of and without the consent of the counsel.
Obviously this is not our present case. Both counsel
were present and the polling only took place after the verdict was brought in properly signed by 6 of the 8 Jurors
with specific findings on amount of damages to be awarded.
In 71 ALR2, Section 2, p643 concerned with Polling
Jury in Civil Cases it states:
The object of polling a Jury is to give each juror an
opportunity to declare his judgment in open court, to enable
the Jury to avail themselves of the Locus Poenitenitiae and
to correct a verdict which they have mistaken, or about
which, upon further reflection, they have doubt, and to ascertain with certainty that each juror approves of the verdicl
as announced and assents thereto at the time of polling, and
that no one has been forced or induced to agree to a verdict
to which he does not actually assent. It has also been declared that "polling the jury is but a means of obtaining ti1e

-11
sence, in open court, of each individual juror, as to the correc.:tness of the verdict rendered, and is the most generally
iecognized means of ascertaining whether the jurors are unanimous in their decision.
The trial courts discretion in respect to polling the
jury is subject to review by the appellate court, but will not
be interferred with unless it is clearly erroneous. (Hillsdale
-vs-Hi Speed Co. Mich Case 47 N. W 2nd 652).
The method of conducting the polling is within the
discretion of the Judge.
In asking questions the Judge should not interrogate
a juror in regard to reasons for his conclusion. But where the
jurors response is questionable further interrogation for the
purpose of ascertaining definitely whether he does or does
not assent to the verdict is permissable (Dixon-vs-Archer Tenn. Case - L\:ll SW:.:nd Gn.:;).
Where special interrogatories are submitted to jury a
polling as to the findings thereon or answers thereto has in
many instances been held proper or at least not prejudicial,
(91 ALR2 p 662).

a~

The exact form of the question is immaterial so long
it is directed merely to ascertaining whether or not he

<issents to the verdict as announced.
The court may permit a juror to correct or explain
a response which, due to mistake, inadvertance, or misunderstanding, varies from the verdict as announced, or is ambiguous. (Andersen-vs-Penn Hall Co. 47F. Supp 691, Hillary
vs Earle Restaurant, Inc., 109 F Supp 829, Earl-vs- Times
IVlt1r.:11 C.1 Calif. 196 Pac. 57.)
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The mere irregularity in polling has generally been
held harmless, so as not to warrant or require the granting
of a new trial or the reversal of a judgment rendered on
the verdict. (71 ALR2 57).
In the polling this court conducted it is clear that the
jury did not understand the meaning of Proposition No. 3.
The polling brought out definitely that 6 of the 8
jurors were answering question 3, "yes" that the Defendanls
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
The only purpose of the "Propositions" was to advise
the court and this the polling did and the Judge correctly
rendered judgment on the verdict for the Plaintiff in the
amounts the Jury found and signed.
RULE 49, URCP provides under Special verdicts and
The court under our Rule for Special Verdict shall
give to the Jury such explanation and instruction concerning
the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable
the Jury to make its finding upon each issue.
In the present case the verdict as reached together
with the polling as to the proximate cause found specifically
all the facts essential for the determination of the cause.
POINT THREE
THE COURTS FAILURE TO GIVE DEFENDANTS REQUESTED INSTRUCTION CONCERNING SOUNDING
OF HORN WAS NOT ERROR.
The court properly instructed in No. 9-J
"There is no duty on the driver of an automobile to

13

sound the horn upon his intending to pass another
vehicle."
It further instructed in 9 (b) the following:

"It was the duty of the driver of a car to use reason-

able care under the circwnstances in driving his car
to avoid danger to himself and others and to observe
and be aware of the condition of the highway, the
traffic thereon, and other existing conditions; in that
regard, he was obliged to observe due care in respect to:
(a) using reasonable care to keep a lookout for
other vehicles or other conditions reasonably to be
anticipated.
(b) not to attempt to pass another vehicle until
he makes observation and ascertains that this can be
done with reasonable safety under the circwnstances.
You will note that the person whose conduct we
set up as a standard is not the extraordinarily cautious
individual, nor the exceptionally skillful one, but a
person of reasonable and ordinary purdence. While
exceptional caution and skill are to be admired and
encouraged, the law does not demand them as a general standard of conduct."
Read together these instructions properly set forth
the law. Plaintiff contends the Jury was not misled by these
instructions.
Failure to give a warning signal does not constitute negligence when there is no apparent necessity
for such a warning. (Nielson -vs- Lott, 81 Utah 265, 17

P2d 272)
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In our case the Plaintiff was following a vehicle going
slow down a main highway, he started to pass within the
speed limit when without warning the vehicle turned left
in front of the Defendant's vehicle to enter a private roadway
in an open field. Under these circumstances there was no
duty to sound his horn. To require a horn signal would be in
conflict with 41-6-146 UCA 1953. It would have the effect oi
requiring a horn signal in the passing of every vehicle on
these open farming areas.

The correctness of an instruction is ordinarily determined by the test of whether the rule of substantive law
therein stated is correct or incorrect.
The court should not give undue prominence to the
theory of one side or the other. If this issue of horn sounding
had been singled out in any further way as the defendant
requested the jury may have been misled into believing it
was the controlling issue, which it wasn't. (53 Am. Jur. 568Trial)
If the instructions considered as a whole fairly prese111

the issues to the jury and state the governing law, error in
individual instructions may be disregarded as harmless, and
where statements of law contained in instruction are substantially correct they will not be condemned as prejudicial
errors unless they tend to mislead the jury. (5 Am. Jur. 2nd
810, Appeal and Error)
Prejudice cannot be inferred on appeal from the fact
that some of the instruction given by a trial court could huve
been drawn more precisely.

:t

e
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SUMMARY

The courts instructions clearly set forth the law, the
jury verdict as determined after polling by the court properly
indicated that the jury found in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant and the court properly entered judg( ment on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
R.
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